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Reconfi guration of Geopolitical Strategies 
in Trump’s Era: The Impact of American Political 
Leadership’s Idiosyncrasies on the Traditional 
Transatlantic Relations
Abstract
The International System is traversing a challenging stage in its evolution. 
The United States should carefully consider the risks of an idiosyncratic 
leadership and closely work with their European partners, securing a world 
order based on the norms of multilateralism and democracy. Still, the US 
President Donald Trump unveils an approach based on emotional and 
synchronous elements. As a matter of consequence, the EU is considering 
other geopolitical alternatives to accomplish its goals and deliver the 
best outcome to the people it serves and for global prosperity. The paper 
investigates the very specifi c psychological factors infl uencing Trumpian 
political thinking and justifying his corresponding foreign policy decision-
making processes, in the current transatlantic environment. By contextual 
examples, the analysis reveals the sensitivities and fl aws in applying 
a subjective, belief-based approach of international (bilateral) relations. 
We put things into a broader perspective, by analysing the implications of 
such political behaviour patterns for the international liberal order, in the 
circumstances of the more and more prominent geopolitical triangle: the 
EU–China–the US.
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Introduction
The psychological approaches defi ne a series of modern theories, 
complementary to the classical models of decision-making (the rational 
actor, the organizational behaviour and the governmental policies’ 
models), useful when examining the inner driving forces of a particular 
individual or decision-making group, involved in a specifi c political 
context. The cognitive approach and groupthink represent the two types 
of psychological approaches, bearing similar framing tendencies, on the 
basis of a distorted, limited, self-censored and stereotyped content, with 
reference to actors and events outside the comfort zone of the subjective 
or like-minded decision makers. The advisory system as a practice of 
groupthink is best exemplifi ed by the American presidential institution 
and the Trump administration makes no exception from the rule. 
Psychological perspectives will be discussed in detail in the fi rst part of 
this paper, entitled Understanding the businessman-like Trumpian idiosyncratic 
legacy: a psychological analysis of the current American political leadership.
In the second part, Framing new models of political decision-making in the 
current transatlantic context, we explore how the traditional transatlantic 
alliance has been slowly decreasing in power and infl uence as a collective, 
global actor, displaying gradual signs of implosion. Tensions escalated 
especially as President Donald Trump popularized his protectionist, 
populist view on the future of the American society and a sceptical, 
transactional attitude towards the European Union, respectively, seen 
through the lens of rival, a competitor “very tough to deal with”. Personal 
characteristics, inherited business skills and deeply rooted, stereotyped 
beliefs played a signifi cant role in the political process of decision-making. 
This attitude has in fact pushed Europeans to detach, both mentally and 
practically, from the cooperation and partnering prospects with the US. 
They took steps to develop as a strategically autonomous political entity, 
aiming to become a more powerful voice at international level, on their 
own, without relying on American engagement anymore.
With China on the rise, both the EU and the US face a real, common 
counter-candidate to the global leadership position. They have 
each secured bilateral commitment involving Beijing, while largely 
disregarding a potential renewal of the talks in “the Western hemisphere”, 
for months on end. This shift of paradigm has many chances to convert 
the main geopolitical trends of the current world order, while at the same 
time weakening the transatlantic pillar of liberal values. The coronavirus 
pandemic adds a new dimension to this already complex picture, 
positioning China in a quite controversial context, impacting upon further 
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openness from the Western partners. These aspects are being investigated 
in the last part of the article, subtitled Reconfi guring geopolitics: strategies 
to adjust EU’s and US’ foreign relations with China in the new transatlantic 
environment.
Understanding the Businessman-like Trumpian 
Idiosyncratic Legacy: A Psychological Analysis 
of the Current American Political Leadership
Rational and stable political leadership is one of the main pillars on 
which a society is based. However, it cannot be overlooked the fact that 
emotions too can play a signifi cant role in shaping the leadership style 
a prominent political fi gure adopts. The decision-making process can be 
easily infl uenced by many (internal and external) factors. Psychological 
factors account for a complex and well-defi ned category of inner elements 
impacting upon national political strategies to a considerable extent. 
Among these, experts have included factors such as personality traits or 
the leaders’ set of beliefs, emotions, images, cognitive consistency, the use 
of analogies, intelligence and how all these infl uence the decision-making 
process and the expected outcome.1
Richard Fagen differentiated between two styles of decision-making in 
foreign policy: calculated and emotional.2 Falling into the second category, 
idiosyncrasies (personal, social factors)3 can lead to more complex-
realistic approaches of decision-making, compared to the “classical” 
rational model. They bring a personal mixture of internal and external 
factors into foreign policy decisions-making, capable of infl uencing the 
course of an action.4 
Analysing Donald Trump’s idiosyncratic profi le has been a delight 
for many political scientists and psychologists, as well as international 
relations experts. With a surprising turnaround when it comes to the 
leadership style he adopted, the US president has undoubtedly encouraged 
a new paradigm to discuss transatlantic relations, as personal convictions 
1  M.G. Ciot, Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Cambridge Scholars, 
Newcastle upon Tyne 2014, p. 182. 
2  R.F. Fagen, Calculation and emotion in foreign policy: the Cuban Case, ”Journal of 
Confl ict Resolution”, vol. VI, no. 3/1962, pp. 214–221.
3  F. Campanale, B. Shakun, Behavioral Idiosyncracies and How They May Affect 
Investment Decision, ”American Association of Individual Investors Journal”, vol. XIX, 
no. 9/1997, pp. 13–17.
4  M.G. Ciot, Idiosyncrasies In Trump’s Foreign Policy Decision Making, in: Analele 
Universității din Oradea, ed. M. Brie, University of Oradea, Oradea 2016, p. 44.
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and specifi c framing of Europeans’ behaviour determined Trump to assess 
the longstanding partnership into a “tit-for-tat” competition framework 
and, therefore, to initiate radical actions that cast doubt about the 
steadiness of American engagement in European and international affairs. 
Consequently, the EU member states found themselves in the need to 
reconfi gure geopolitical and foreign relations’ priorities and to look more 
at their own capacities, vulnerabilities and opportunities that lie ahead, 
even related to third parties (other international actors).
One of the most complex analyses regarding the psychological profi le 
of Donald Trump belongs to Dan P. McAdams, a prestigious author, well-
known for his fi ne profi ling of American presidents (Reagan, Bush Jr.). 
Investigating personality, developmental and social psychology elements, 
in his article entitled The Mind of Donald Trump, he identifi ed the main 
personality characteristics, that will have had a signifi cant impact on 
his presidency: narcissism, disagreeableness and grandiosity. McAdams 
wrote: “Trump seems supremely cognizant of the fact that he is always 
acting. He moves through life like a man who knows he is always being 
observed. If all human beings are, by their very nature, social actors, then 
Donald Trump seems to be more so–superhuman, in this one primal 
sense”.5 
McAdams analysed his dispositions, cognitive styles, motivation and 
self-conceptions, all four aspects being relevant in defi ning the leader’s 
idiosyncrasies. Basically, these features will defi ne a psychological model 
of decision-making, exploiting the tendencies that are specifi c to the 
cognitive approach and that will be discussed and exemplifi ed in the 
second part of the paper. Based on the Big Five theory of personality, 
McAdams distinguished between the following categories: Extroversion, 
Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Openness. On 
a particular note, McAdams noticed that President Donald Trump 
shows a “sky-high extroversion combined with off-the-chart low 
agreeableness”. 
Dispositions offer us clues in defi ning and understanding a leader’s 
decision-making style. Particularly speaking, extroverts tend to take 
high-stakes risks and people with low levels of openness rarely question 
their deepest convictions. As a real-estate developer, we can say that he 
has taken big risks, and it is the case in Trumpian politics too, trying to 
deliver big payoffs (i.e. to Make America Great Again! – as his campaign 
slogan goes. “I fi nd the people who are the best in the world at what needs 
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to be done, then I hire them to do it, and then I let them do it… but 
I always watch over them”6).
Regarding mental habits, The Art of a Deal by Donald Trump advices 
on how to start a negotiation from a position of strength, and the concept 
of “deal” represents a personalized schema (“a way of knowing the 
world that permeates his thoughts”),7 informing us about the decision-
making style he prefers, even in politics. Trump is focusing on personal 
relationships and one-on-one negotiating tactics, another strong indicator 
for an idiosyncratic approach of the position he occupies. 
Discussing motivations, we investigate further beyond President’s 
narcissism, to uncover what are his goals. McAdams noticed the most 
important goal of a narcissistic person is to love himself and to be loved by 
others, “to promote the greatness of the self, for all to see”8 – and this can be 
exemplifi ed by the US leader’s initiative to put his name on his buildings, 
books, university and TV shows. “Narcissism undoubtedly is a general 
description of President Trump’s personality, but it is not a psychiatric 
disorder by itself ”, adds British doctor David Owen, in his book entitled 
Hubris, the road to Donald Trump. Power, populism and narcissism.9
One of the representations of American presidents comes from the 
narrative, namely the stories about themselves, from where they exert 
moral elements and frame a nation-defi ning legacy, McAdams argues. 
From a psychological point of view, narrative identities “explain how 
they came to be who they are”.10 The Trumpian narrative, in his own 
acceptation, “expresses nothing like Bush’s gentle nostalgia or Obama’s 
curiosity, but a sense of danger and a need for toughness: The world 
cannot be trusted”.11 
Approaching politics with a businessman mindset, centered on his 
own person, has offered us important information about future decisional 
steps. We identifi ed the presence of emotional (Negative Emotions), 
motivational (Self-Realization, Responsibility) and social perception 
(Self, Others) idiosyncrasies of Trump.12 The way in which his election 
campaign was designed also delivered the message that we are facing an 
idiosyncratic leader, who will base his decisions on emotional grounds. 
6  D.J. Trump, Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America, Threshold Editions, 
Reprint edition 2016, p. 16.
7  D.P. McAdams, op. cit.
8  Ibidem.
9  D. Owen, Hubris, the road to Donald Trump. Power, populism and narcissism, 
Methuen, York 2018, p. 15.
10  McAdams, op. cit.
11  Ibidem.
12  M.G. Ciot, Negotiation…, pp. 183, 192–193, 196–197, 199.
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Framing New Models of Political Decision-Making 
in the Current Transatlantic Context 
The US relation with the EU is one of the controversial subjects falling 
under a new Trumpian political doctrine. The bilateral relation has 
suffered visible transformations because of a different framing involving 
the psychological (cognitive) approach elements in the decision-making 
process, infl uenced by populist and protectionist viewpoints, personal 
beliefs of the US leader, because of various historical analogies regarding 
the American destiny in the world and on its very own territory. 
As Donald Trump took offi ce at the White House, publicly expressed 
messages started to worry its overseas partners. Engaged in an enduring 
blame game, he viewed the US as a historically altruistic nation, motivating 
US’ failures in a defensive manner (cognitive distortion): “For many 
decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the expense of American 
industry, subsidized the armies of other countries, while allowing for the 
very sad depletion of our military. We’ve defended other nation’s borders 
while refusing to defend our own. (...) No region has benefi ted more from 
U.S. security guarantees since World War II than Europe”.13
Out of the “America First” strategy, trade tensions arouse on multiple 
fronts, between the US and states like China, Canada, Mexico or Japan,14 
but the EU was nonetheless a major source of dispute for the current 
administration. The US president erroneously framed it an enemy or, at 
least, a fi erce competitor, “very tough to deal with” because it had “taken 
advantage” of the U.S. (cognitive distortion). This perception clearly 
impacted upon his foreign policy decisions and corresponding actions to 
implement them.
As the EU imposed several agricultural trade barriers on US exports 
to the continent, this became a serious impediment for President Trump’s 
engagement in comprehensive commercial relations with Europe: “Europe 
has been treating us very badly,” Trump said. “Over the last 10, 12 years, 
there’s been a tremendous defi cit with Europe. They have barriers that are 
incredible...”.15 The need for retaliation thus came as a natural thing, in 
13  M. Karnitschnig, Donald Trump leaves Europe in the cold, „Politico”, 20.01.2017, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-leaves-europe-in-the-cold-in-inauguration/ 
(access 14.03.2020).
14  R. Noack, Now that Trump has a trade deal with China, some Europeans fear he 
will focus his trade threats on them, “Washington Post”, 17.01.2020, https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/17/now-that-trump-has-trade-deal-with-china-some-euro-
peans-fear-he-will-focus-his-trade-threats-them/ (access 14.03.2020).
15  A. Shalal, D. Lawder, As Trump takes aim at EU trade, European offi cials brace for 
fi ght, „Reuters”, 11.02.2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-europe-analy-
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President Trump’s acceptation, largely ignoring medium and long-term 
consequences over the future of the transatlantic partnership (not putting 
things into perspective-cognitive distortions). 
The narrative in which the EU is seen as a threat to American national 
interest (or security) proved to be a harmful discourse for transatlantic 
relations. Phil Hogan, European Commissioner for Trade said that “we 
reject the U.S. labelling the E.U. as a security risk in order to justify 
the imposition of tariffs” as “the narrative is hurtful to our European 
people”.16
After many months of longstanding tensions, the two blocks proved 
willing to conclude a deal as soon as possible, covering trade, technology 
and energy. “I am looking forward to working with President Trump on 
the opportunities and challenges ahead of us. I am convinced that we can 
engage in a positive US-EU agenda in trade, as well as on technology, 
energy and much more besides”,17 Ursula von der Leyen, president of the 
European Commission declared on the occasion of her bilateral meeting 
with the US President on the margins of World Economic Forum in Davos, 
in January 2020. “We’ve been talking about it for a while, and hopefully we 
can get something done”,18 Trump responded, nevertheless reiterating the 
validity of punishing levies on the European automotive sector. 
Moreover, thinking of the remaining controversial aspects, Hosuk 
Lee-Makiyama, director of the European Center for International 
Political Economy, suggested that the course of reaching a commercial 
deal with the Europeans can be quite tough for the US “since the new 
commission in Europe has very little policy space to offer the Americans 
any concessions, whether it’s agriculture or civil aircraft or taxes...”.19 
After a series of ups and downs in the past year in bilateral US-China 
trade relations, concluding a Phase-One deal with Beijing on January 15, 
2020 made Europeans fear Trump’s disinterest in striking a deal with the 
EU, especially as the last year in December U.S. Trade Representative 
sis/as-trump-takes-aim-at-eu-trade-european-offi cials-brace-for-fi ght-idUSKBN2051AK 
(access 12.03.2020).
16  P. Hogan, Refreshing Transatlantic Trade Relations, Keynote Address at Centre for 




17  B. Rios, Von der Leyen and Trump fi ne tune transatlantic relations in Davos, „Eu-
ractiv”, 21.01.2020, http://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/von-der-leyen-
and-trump-fi ne-tune-transatlantic-relations-in-davos/ (access 12.03.2020).
18  Ibidem.
19  R. Noack, op. cit.
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Robert Lighthizer spoke about their “very unbalanced” trade relationship 
with Europe, a potential trend of Washington’s focus in 2020. 
Other erroneous convictions like “NATO is obsolete” caused additional 
unrest among European partners by suggesting the hypothesis of America 
withdrawing from NATO, an impulsive decision which would mean a de 
facto dissolution of the North-Atlantic Alliance. 
The famous slogan, popular during President Trump’s campaign, 
Make America Great Again!, takes us back in time by means of historical 
analogies, if we consider the imperialist and elitist view on the American 
destiny, restoring its traditional superiority and uniqueness. This tendency 
of motivation by using or implying historical examples or previous 
successful policies was defi ned as a cognitive shortcut, often impeding 
decision-makers in conducting a sensitive thinking process.
Another highly important feature of the American political decision-
making model relies on the traditional, very specifi c groupthink20, exemplifi ed 
by the advisory system21 acting close to the US president and trying to bring 
their contribution to a particular decision regarding national security and 
foreign policy matters. The tradition of the Cabinet can be traced back 
to the beginnings of the Presidency itself. It was established by Article 
II, section 2 of the US Constitution22. Throughout time, the advisory 
system has been observed as a practice in American presidential history, 
with both successful (Nixon-Kissinger, Bush-Scowcroft or Wilson-House 
cooperation) and unsuccessful records (see, for instance, Pearl Harbor-the 
American Commander group believed that the Japanese won’t ever risk 
attacking the US, the admiral joking about the situation).23
President Trump has been subject to criticisms for gathering as senior 
advisers a like-minded, “camera-ready” crew, with scarce policy experience 
(although he seemed not to pay signifi cant attention or listen to those around 
him at all times). It is the case, for example, with Lary Kudlow, president’s 
chief economic adviser and former TV host. Kudlow supported the  US-China 
deal, as he called it a “historic” and unprecedented agreement.24
20  P.A. Kowert, Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advi-
sors?, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY 2002.
21  T. Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory 
Process in Foreign Affairs, Columbia University Press, New York 2001.
22  J. Shallus, The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription, https://www.
archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript (access 21.03.2020).
23  R. Jackson, G. Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations. Theories and ap-
proaches, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, p. 235.
24  T. Kaplan, Kudlow: Phase One of China trade deal is ‘historic’ and will help US 
economy grow faster, “FoxNews”, 15.01.2020, https://www.foxnews.com/media/larry-
kudlow-china-trade-deal-defends-american-economy (access 21.03.2020).
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Peter Navarro, Trump’s top trade advisor argued forcefully against any 
bilateral commercial deal with China and pressed for stiff tariffs to be 
imposed on this country, going beyond the objections raised by fellow 
advisers, ironically regarded as “globalists”. Trump followed suit on 
dealing with China, although he empathised with Navarro’s tough view 
on Beijing’s growing infl uence and accepted to impose severe tariffs 
on Chinese products. “The deal with China is a massive deal”, Trump 
affi rmed, adding: “No, I’m not a globalist”.25 His trade adviser gradually 
managed to infl uence Donald Trump on other foreign policy issues like 
NAFTA (now USMCA), after repeated opposition from other senior 
offi cials, among which Gary D. Cohn, the former head of the US National 
Economic Council, blocking several attempts to trigger the NAFTA 
withdrawal process. 
On transatlantic trade (see the politically dead TTIP), Navarro saw 
Germany as one of the main hurdles to a US trade deal with the EU, using 
a “grossly undervalued” euro to “exploit” the US and its EU partners.26 
More recently, Wilbur Ross, US Secretary of Commerce, was at best 
optimistic about the possibility of concluding a deal with the Europeans 
in 2020 and he believes trade talks can produce a deal before duties on 
vehicles are needed to be applied. “The president simply said this is, ‘If 
it fails,’ where our working assumption is it will not fail and that we will 
make a deal with them” (n.n.the EU).27 Still, it is not a tragedy if the deal 
does not materialise, showing a sense of empathy for President Trump’s 
alternative to impose additional tariffs: “But if not, the President is totally 
comfortable going the other direction”.28
Former US national security advisor Michael Flynn acknowledged 
for ACB News having tried to shape President Trump’s view on NATO. 
“We did talk about NATO, and I told him ... NATO doesn’t pay their 
bills. (...) NATO is a 20th century model and needs to be retooled for 21st 
century threats that we collectively face. You know, cyber is one of them. 
25  A. Rappeport, A. Swanson, Peter Navarro, Trump’s Trade Warrior, Has Not 
Made His Peace With China, ”The New York Times”, 26.12.2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/12/26/us/politics/peter-navarro-china-trade.html (access 21.03.2020).
26  S. Donnan, Trump’s top trade adviser accuses Germany of currency exploitation, 
“Financial Times”, 31.01.2017, https://www.ft.com/content/57f104d2-e742-11e6-893c-
082c54a7f539 (access 21.03.2020).
27  J. Garber, J. Langford, Europe has ‘sense of panic’ over securing US trade deal: 
Wilbur Ross, „Fox Business”, 23.01.2020, https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/us-eu-
rope-trade-deal-wilbur-ross (access 21.03.2020).
28  S. Amaro, It’s ‘complicated to negotiate with the European Union,’ Wilbur Ross 
says, “CNBC”, 17.06.2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/17/its-complicated-to-negoti-
ate-with-the-eu-wilbur-ross-says.html (access 21.03.2020).
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So I said those things to him when we fi rst talked”.29 On the contrary, 
former senior adviser John Bolton, who also served in the administration 
of President George W. Bush, warned about the negative consequences of 
Trump’s allegations on NATO.
In November 2018, in an interview for Fox News Sunday, Trump 
summarized his view on the actual decision-making process and on the 
advisory team he owns, whom he described as “talented”, but at the same 
time internally competitive, providing him information on which he 
bases his decisions, nevertheless considering what he feels is “the right 
way forward”: “I don’t think about, you know, how I make’em. I make 
what I consider the right decision, I have some tremendously talented 
people and I will talk to them and sometimes I’ll have them go at each 
other, I do like that (...). They’ve very competitive people and at the end 
I make a decision and it’s certainly – on the economy, a lot of things 
we’ve been – we’ve made a lot of good decisions and I want to keep it that 
way”.30
Reconfi guring Geopolitics: Strategies to Adjust EU’s 
and US’ Foreign Relations with China 
in the New Transatlantic Environment 
The Chinese factor could become very prominent in the next years 
and the triangle EU–China–US could easily become a very interesting 
reality, in the sense of additional, bidirectional interdependencies. It has 
already prefi gurated as a quite infl uential – and sometimes controversial 
– geopolitical game fi eld, if we take into consideration the oscillating, 
discontinuing but nevertheless appealing ties between the EU and China 
and the US and China, respectively. 
The recent trend of the events leads us to a sad but realistic conclusion: 
the transatlantic relation is on the verge of losing ground in front of a new 
confi guration of global interactions, a geopolitical network where China 
(and it may not be the only one) manages to impose itself more and more 
as an emerging global actor, gaining credibility and an increasing rate of 
commercial and high-technology success amidst European and American 
29  J. Fishel, Mike Flynn Says He Helped Shape Trump’s Views on NATO, “ABC 
News”, 19.11.2016, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/mike-fl ynn-helped-shape-trumps-
views-nato/story?id=43642585 (access 21.03.2020).
30  J. Lucas, U.S. President Donald Trump on his decision-making process: ”I don’t think 
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strategic partners. The latest crisis we are traversing after the rapid spread 
of the coronavirus infection has nevertheless introduced a risky element 
in trilateral networking, seemingly disrupting transatlantic engagement 
more and more and raising a question mark on China’s goodwill and 
partnering stability. But let us have a look at the situation before this 
biological threat entered the international community’s focus.
A common feature in their bilateral relation with Beijing is that both 
the EU and the US are constantly keeping an eye on each other’s openness 
to China. The lower the mutual engagements, the higher the chances 
for Brussels and Washington to sit at the negotiation table, it appears. 
China appears as an attraction for both but, at the same time, it can 
devastate the two’s status on the world economic spectrum, if too much 
infl uence is being credited in the form of apparently harmless or mutually 
benefi cial Chinese investments in Europe and the United States. The gap 
in transatlantic cooperation-considerably due to the new idiosyncratic 
leadership approach in Washington- is a fertile ground for new actors to 
gather sympathy and to present their strategic offer as more convenient, 
while further disengagement can be also entertained by the EU and/or US 
“open-door policy” towards third parties (to an extent that might deliver 
fear and instability over transatlantic affairs).
Though the former European Commission impressed by labelling 
China as “a strategic competitor” or “a systemic rival”, the new executive 
led by Ursula von der Leyen seems to think in another geopolitical 
paradigm, much less confrontational. A pending common EU strategy 
towards Beijing accounts for a challenging enterprise to adjust preferences 
and to join forces, for the most reasonable and satisfactory outcome. 
In the last months, individual states’ position towards China 
has suffered a visible shift of paradigm, notwithstanding national 
controversies in “internal opposing camps” (see, for instance, Germany’s 
and UK’s tendency to embrace the next-generation technology developed 
by telecommunications giant Huawei, or German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s hardcore optimism about the EU and China concluding 
a comprehensive investment agreement in time for the bilateral summit 
in Leipzig, September 2020).31
A landmark in EU-Chinese bilateralism is, of course, the Belt and Road 
Initiative, launched in 2013, through which Beijing aims to attract as many 
partner countries from around the globe as possible, in an ample infrastructure 
investment program, paving the route for the new SILK ROAD diplomacy 
31  N. Barkin, Europe’s moment of truth with China. 6 factors that will shape the Con-
tinent’s relationship with Beijing in 2020, “Politico”, 13.01.2020, https://www.politico.eu/
article/europes-moment-of-truth-with-china-trade-eu/ (access 13.03.2020).
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(or the corridor denominated The New Eurasian Land Bridge-connecting 
Western China to Western Russia, for our particular discussion). Though 
long debated within European political circles, the EU as a whole did not 
come up with a unifi ed response to this challenging proposal, weighing up 
carefully all the advantages and disadvantages it entails. 
On a balanced perspective, the megaproject received both applause and 
criticism in Europe. The latter was mostly related to Beijing’s perceived 
strategy to rewrite global rules and rejoice about global dominance by 
means of investing in and supporting industrial and high-tech innovations’ 
development, defying the international multilateral standards, while 
threatening EU’s (perhaps primary) geo-economic sovereignty and internal 
unity, by infl uencing individual EU countries to step into the game. 
Thus, BRI’s growing appeal might be considered a vital moment in 
EU’s geopolitics, when the axis actually started to move sides, as countries 
joined one by one the strategic initiative (embracing the “16+1” offer), 
signing bilateral, BRI-related cooperation agreements, and EU-based 
fi nancial institutions like ERBD or EIB and European companies (see 
DHL, Siemens) followed the same pattern.32
As expected, the US disregard EU intertwining with China and 
have fears about the broader BRI prospects. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization gradually came to be perceived as a potential counter 
candidate for NATO, that has already rendered its ties with the UN, 
the CIS, ASEAN, the Eurasian Economic Community as offi cial and, 
respectively, the Collective Security Treaty Organization.33 More recently, 
Washington has repeatedly warned Europe about the underlying effects 
of accepting China’s 5G technological supremacy, stressing that the vision 
should be much broader and not limited to the opportunity in itself- 
a price-worthy alternative to competing offerings-, as such move could be 
a proper way for Beijing to gain infl uence at global level, considering its 
overall, growing commercial, technological and military expansion in the 
last period. But until the U.S. can offer Europeans a viable alternative to 
Huawei (a Trojan horse on the European continent34), the Chinese option 
is likely to remain unchallenged. 
32  A. Skala-Kuhmann, European Responses to BRI, An overdue assessment, „Horizons-
Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development”, no. 14/2019, p. 150.
33  See I.A. Ghidiu, Reinventarea Drumului Mătăsii, „Economistul”, 28.09.2016, https://
www.economistul.ro/cover/reinventarea-drumului-matasii-733/ (access 13.03.2020).
34  M. Karnitschnig, Europe turns deaf ear to US warnings on Chinese 5G. Washington 
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“I continue to stress to my friends in Europe … that America’s concerns 
about Beijing’s commercial and military expansion should be their concerns 
as well”, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper told the audience at the Munich 
Security Conference in February 2020, a powerful symbol of the Western 
alliance’s geopolitical strength and stability. In the US offi cial’s view, the 
problem lies in the differing perception (of Europeans and Americans, 
respectively) of the threat posed by China in shaping a new world order.
However, Washington has managed to secure the fi rst phase of the 
2020 Economic and Trade Agreement deal with China,35 although not 
cancelling many of the previously imposed tariffs – which adds to the 
puzzling and controversial debate on EU-China-US tripolar geopolitical 
dynamics and cast worries on the European side. 
China agreed to increase its imports (on specifi c products) from the 
US in the coming two years, which will directly impact other countries’ 
exports to China, while the remaining US’ tariffs on Chinese goods will 
mean redirecting these products to other markets, including the EU 
market. Broadly speaking, the overall US’ trade defi cit with Beijing will 
not lower because of implementing the commercial agreement, as larger 
macroeconomic policies’ implications account for the main driver of 
change in this regard.36
Additionally, experts’ opinions confl ict over who has managed to attain 
specifi c leverage over the other by signing Phase-One deal. Some view 
the agreement as a small gain for China at fi rst sight and a continuous 
dependency on US exports, while others state that it actually gives the 
Chinese trading partner “the upper hand”, since purchase commitments 
sealed under bilateral understanding disobey free market principles and 
the broader rules-based trading architecture, bearing strategic, systemic 
costs for the US. That is, Washington faces the risk of slowly undermining 
its potential of global economic leadership, at the expense of a constantly 
evolving, state-led Chinese dirigiste model of economic growth.37
35  Economic And Trade Agreement Between The Government Of The United States 
Of America And The Government Of The People’s Republic Of China, https://ustr.gov/
sites/default/fi les/fi les/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_
Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf (access 15.03.2020).
36  B. Hofman, Commentary: Why China signed an unequal trade deal with the US, 
“Channel News Asia”, 14.02.2020, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commen-
tary/china-us-trade-war-deal-agreement-phase-1-2-tariff-coronavirus-12417824 (access 
15.03.2020).
37  J.P. Meltzer, N. Shenai, Why the purchase commitments in the US-China trade deal 
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Drawing parallels between the EU and the US’ stance on China, it 
seems that both feared the other’s tightening relations with Beijing, the 
reasons being similar, gravitating around Chinese geopolitical advantage 
and the preoccupation for renewing transatlantic ties decreased in 
intensity (especially on the American side). 
Moreover, amidst the worldwide crisis generated by the coronavirus, 
the international community dedicated its attention and resources 
mainly to this humanitarian and economic cause, while other issues fell 
to the second place. Therefore, implementing US–China Phase-One 
deal – and preparing for a second round of trade talks – or negotiating 
a commercial agreement between Europeans and Americans face all the 
premises to be stalled for the moment, especially as President Donald 
Trump framed the new turmoil as originating in a “Chinese virus”, much 
to the Asians’ discontent, though he wanted to make it clear that this is 
not a racist terminology, but simply referring to the place the pandemic 
busted. The allegation also comes as a response to several Chinese offi cials’ 
conspiracy theories that the COVID-19 illness began in the U.S. or was 
brought to China by the U.S. Army, during the October 2019 Military 
World Games in Wuhan. China’s new Foreign Ministry spokesman, 
Zhao Lijian questioned this possibility in a tweet on March 12, 2020.38 
Added to these, President Trump’ immediate measure to impose travel 
restrictions to Europe on March 12 waned again Brussels’ trust in the old 
transatlantic partner.
In the whole framework of interdependent consequences within the 
international, interconnected system, the coronavirus pandemic presented 
China in other denominations as a propagandistic “global saviour”, 
devastating European and American involvement and deepening the 
transatlantic gap, although resentments and doubts about China’s initial 
handling of the crisis still represent a source of anger and mistrust for 
Beijing’s overseas partners.
The Chinese government is trying to “establish itself as a global hero 
that saved many people both in and outside China,” remarks Lee Seong-
hyon, director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute 
in Seoul in an interview for Foreign Policy.39 “China’s coming out strong 
38  A. Panda, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Implies US Military Brought 
Coronavirus to Wuhan, “The Diplomat”, 13.03.2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/
chinese-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-implies-us-military-brought-coronavirus-to-wu-
han/ (access 15.03.2020).
39  M. Soendergaard Larsen, R. Gramer, China Casts Itself as Global Savior While 
U.S. and EU Focus on Virus at Home, „Foreign Policy”, 19.03.2020, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2020/03/19/china-us-eu-coronavirus-great-power-competition/ (access 20.03.2020).
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with its PR, sensing, correctly, that this global epidemic is also a great 
opportunity to burnish China’s soft power credentials with Europe and 
[others]. On the other hand, America is not investing enough resources 
to help its traditional allies and friends, and not investing enough in this 
narrative war”.40
Conclusions
The transatlantic gap is enlarging further as new challenges appear, 
affecting the functioning of the international system. Biological (as well as 
economic) risks posed by the ongoing crisis around the worldwide spread 
of the coronavirus add to the already distorted political and diplomatic 
dialogue between Brussels and Washington. 
Furthermore, the crisis is challenging third parties’ position, as China 
faces the major blame for this pandemic, losing trust in both Europeans 
and Americans’ perception.
In the last years, China rose as an infl uential global actor, boosting 
its economic, technological and military power and offering transactional 
alternatives to status-seeker, world powers like the EU and the US. Both 
engaged in constantly monitoring the other’s rapprochement to China, 
they feared consequences of Beijing’s expansionism and its geopolitical 
alternative, nevertheless preferring their own bilateralism with the Asian 
partner, detrimental to an investment in transatlantic cooperation.
The gradual disruption in EU-US commercial and security relations 
was supported by the emotional leadership that President Donald Trump 
has been practising during his fi rst term in offi ce. His political discourse 
and the decisions he has made unveiled an idiosyncratic approach that 
was shaped by a specifi c, psychological model of decision-making, marked 
by cognitive distortions impacting upon his “opponents’ susceptibility 
towards American persistent commitment to the Western cause”.
The advisory system, bearing a longstanding tradition in the US 
presidential history, remains a fact in the Trump administration, but 
its overall capacity to infl uence foreign policy decisions reaches an 
average level. Cabinet advisers often engage in competitive rhetoric over 
problematic issues, trying to pursue the leader’s fi nal say but, as President 
Trump himself put it, in the end, he does what he feels right to do.
A rising China could be an argument for the potential assertiveness 
of illiberal, undemocratic values within the international community, 
undermining the stability of transatlantic alliance and its adherents. The 
fact that both the EU and the US perceived China as challenging current 
40  Ibidem.
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geopolitics but still, they accepted the invitation for pursuing partnership 
could come at a serious cost for the democratic world order in the not-too-
distant future.
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